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Abstract: In training networks, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises 
pool their resources to train apprentices within the framework of the dual VET 
system, while an intermediary organisation is tasked with managing operations. 
Over the course of their apprenticeship, the apprentices switch from one training 
company to another on a (half-) yearly basis. Drawing on a case study of four 
training networks in Switzerland and the theoretical framework of the sociology of 
conventions, this paper aims to understand the reasons for the slow dissemination 
and reluctant adoption of this promising form of organising VET in Switzerland. 
The results of the study show that the system of moving from one company to 
another creates a variety of free-rider constellations in the distribution of the 
collectively generated corporative benefits. This explains why companies are 
reluctant to participate in this model. For the network to be sustainable, the 
intermediary organisation has to address discontent arising from free-rider 
problems while taking into account that the solutions found are always tentative 
and will often result in new free-rider problems.  
 
Keywords: Vocational Education and Training, Inter-firm Cooperation, Training 
Networks, Cooperative VET, Initial VET, Dual VET, Case Studies, Sociology of 
Conventions, Switzerland 
 
Bibliographical notes:  
Dr Regula Julia Leemann holds a professorship in educational sociology at the 
School for Teacher Education in Basel and is a member of the Centre for 
Educational Sciences at the University of Basel. Her research interests focus on 
educational inequalities (gender, social origin), vocational education and training, 
academic careers, educational institutions and organisations, and transitions from 
school to work. 
Coorporative VET in Training Networks  
IJRVET 2015 
285 
Dr Christian Imdorf holds a professorship in educational sociology at the 
University of Bern, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. His research 
interests are educational systems (in an international comparative perspective), 
vocational and educational training, transitions to tertiary education, school-to-
work transitions, discrimination and inequalities in education, and labour market 
research. 
 
Acknowledgement: 
We would like to extend many thanks to Andrea Tönjes and Stephan Elkins 
(SocioTrans - Social Science Translation & Editing) for their careful and thorough 
work in translating the text from German to English. My thanks are also due to the 
anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this 
article. 
 
 
  
R.J. Leemann & C. Imdorf 
 
IJRVET 2015 
286 
1 Introduction 
“It’s good that there is a network [...] because then 
one can also take advantage of synergies, but in our 
case it’s mainly the small ones [companies] that 
benefit.” (Person responsible for in-company training, 
Public Transport Network) 
Over the past two decades, the Swiss VET system has seen the establishment of so-
called training networks (Ausbildungsverbünde). This model of vocational 
education and training means that companies, particularly small and medium-sized 
enterprises, form a network and pool their in-company training resources for the 
joint training of apprentices. Training networks have several objectives: they 
broaden the qualifications of apprentices (Leemann and Birr 2015), create new 
training places, increase training efficiency for the participating companies 
(Walther and Renold 2005) and enable more inclusive recruitment and mentoring 
practices than companies can provide on an individual basis (Imdorf and Leemann 
2012). 
 This is why this model of vocational education and training has great potential 
in terms of the qualification and integration tasks associated with dual VET. It can 
thus play a major role in adapting the VET system to the new demands arising 
from technological, economic and social change. 
 In several other countries, national vocational education policy has promoted 
inter-firm cooperation and there are various other forms of cooperative training 
based on different organisational and funding models in these countries. The Swiss 
model involves some initial funding and information by the federal government, 
while the operational management of the largely self-sustaining network is in the 
hands of an intermediary organisation, the so-called lead agency. This agency 
recruits both the training companies and the apprentices and is responsible for the 
training programme as such. The apprentices are employed by the lead agency and 
switch companies several times over the course of their training (rotation principle). 
 However, despite being a very promising form of organising in-company 
training – be it for the companies, the apprentices or the VET system as a whole – 
the number of training networks in Switzerland is growing only slowly. 
Unfortunately, there is no statistical data available on the total number of training 
networks or the overall number of apprenticeship places that they provide. On the 
basis of an evaluation by the Swiss Federal Agency for Vocational Training and 
Technology (BBT 2008) and our own research on the Internet, we estimate that 
over the last decade there has been only a slight increase from roughly 1% of all 
training places within the dual VET system to around 2–3%. 
 The aim of this article is to identify reasons for the low degree of 
institutionalisation of this training model in Switzerland. How can it be that this 
organisational arrangement faces difficulties in gaining acceptance in a country 
with a long tradition of dual VET? In a first attempt to zero in on this question, we 
can state that the Swiss model is a very ambitious and complex form of 
organisation. The companies that participate in this division of labour in providing 
cooperative VET are in different situations and have different motives. While they 
can pass on part of their training responsibilities to the lead agency, this involves 
surrendering decision-making powers as well. From the apprentices’ perspective, 
to be trained in a network is interesting and offers broad knowledge of the 
occupational field. From the participating companies’ perspective, however, the 
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pooling of resources can create constellations that give rise to free-rider problems. 
This could possibly explain the low prevalence of training networks in Switzerland. 
 We will, therefore, take a closer look at such potentially problematic 
constellations. Starting from the assumption that free-rider problems do exist in 
these networks, we will address two questions: (1) Which particular constellations 
draw criticism because of single actors disproportionately profiting from the 
training network and its corporative benefits, that is, by contributing fewer 
resources than benefits reaped (free-rider problem)? (2) How do the lead agency 
and the companies within the network try to address these free-rider problems? 
What are their solution strategies? 
 To examine these questions from a theoretical angle, we will draw on the 
sociology of conventions (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, 2006). This theoretical 
framework provides the means to get a grasp on (a) the mode of coordinating 
action among the various network actors, (b) the areas of conflict arising from the 
joint training of apprentices and (c) the ways of dealing with these conflicts. The 
data for our study come from four case studies of four training networks in 
Switzerland that were selected on the basis of typological criteria (Yin 2009). For 
each network, we conducted expert interviews with the representatives of the lead 
agency and with company representatives responsible for in-house VET. 
 The article is structured as follows: Section 2 starts by providing a summary 
of the current national and international state of research on the significance of 
training networks in VET (2.1) and then presents the Swiss model with particular 
attention paid to the concept of resource pooling and potential free-rider 
constellations (2.2). Section 3 introduces the reader to the theoretical framework of 
the sociology of conventions used to identify free-rider constellations. Section 4 
presents the four training networks studied and outlines our methodological 
approach (4.1), gives the results of our analysis with special emphasis on 
imbalances in the distribution of corporative benefits and on strategies to resolve 
this problem during the provision of training (4.2) and after its completion (4.3). 
Section 5 summarises our findings and ends with a brief conclusion. 
2 Training networks as an innovative model in vocational education and 
training: Opportunities and problems 
In this section, we begin by presenting models of inter-firm cooperation in 
vocational training that exist in other national VET systems, ask how common 
these models are and review research findings on their opportunities and risks (2.1). 
We will then introduce the Swiss model and explain how resource pooling within a 
network can create free-rider problems in the distribution of the jointly generated 
collective goods (2.2). 
2.1 The significance of inter-firm cooperation in vocational training in other 
national VET systems 
In several countries, national vocational education policy has promoted inter-firm 
cooperation as an alternative way of organising the provision of vocational training. 
Of particular interest for our study are so-called group training companies in 
Australia, group training associations in the UK, local training agencies in Norway 
and training networks (Ausbildungsverbünde) in Germany and Austria. The 
significance of these organisational arrangements varies by country. In the early 
2000s, around 14% of all apprentices and trainees in Australia and around 10 per 
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cent in the UK received vocational training in cooperative training schemes 
(Cooney and Gospel 2008), compared to 70% of the apprentices in Norway 
(Bowman 2005; Michelsen and Høst 2004). Group training was introduced decades 
ago in the UK (late 1940s) and in Australia (1970s), whereas the expansion of 
training agencies and networks has been more recent in Norway, (Eastern) 
Germany and Austria (1990s). 
 Cooperative training structures come in different types, shapes and sizes 
(BMBF 2011). While some studies of such training schemes in Germany, Austria 
and Australia mention rotational systems (Cooney 2003; Lachmayr and Dornmayr 
2008; Schlottau et al. 2003), other studies do not address the issue of whether 
apprentices switch companies. 
 The models range from community-based schemes geared to meeting local 
and regional needs to employer- and industry-based organisations providing 
industry-specific training designed to address skill shortages. Some of these 
arrangements are the result of bottom-up initiatives by cooperating firms with little 
external coordination; others were initiated top-down from the outside, i.e., with 
government support or the help of large firms (Cooney 2003; Cooney and Gospel 
2008; Gospel and Foreman 2006). In the case of Norway, Michelsen and Høst 
(2004) distinguish three organisational models: the classical “artisan” model (one-
trade model), the branch model (broader sector or trades), which is the most 
frequent form, and the multi-trade model (especially in rural areas), while Gospel 
and Foreman (2006) distinguish between single- and multi-occupational models. 
The Norwegian training agencies are run either by firms, independent associations, 
subsections of employer associations or by private for-profit enterprises. 
 International research has outlined several benefits of inter-firm cooperation 
in training: the costs of employment and training are collectivised and shared and 
the administrative costs of training are reduced especially for small and medium-
sized enterprises (economies of scale). Apart from the costs, the risks of employing 
apprentices are also shared and lowered, in particular if the apprentices are 
employed directly with the training agency and not by the individual training firms. 
This factor reduces the employers’ fear of being at a competitive disadvantage and 
a potential victim of poaching, which makes them more willing to engage in 
training. Through the collective provision of training and employment of 
apprentices, cooperative training schemes provide collective goods not only to the 
member firms. The mobilisation of training firms secures apprentices and therefore 
creates a broader public good and social capital for communities, industries and the 
national economy (Bowman 2005; Cooney 2003; Gospel and Foreman 2006). 
 However, a high level of government funding seems to be an essential 
prerequisite for this model to materialise, at least in countries such as Australia, the 
UK and Norway where group training heavily depends on government subsidies. 
In those three countries, but also in Germany, cooperation in the provision of 
training has proven to be reliable and has boosted the quality of VET, especially in 
small-firm economies and at local levels (Unwin et al. 2012; Lutz and Grünert 
1999). 
 Culpepper’s (2003) in-depth analysis of the development of training networks 
in Eastern Germany in the 1990s has shown that the successful implementation of 
cooperative training depends on the capacity of intermediary actors (e.g., lead 
agencies, training agencies) to respond to the fears and concerns of local 
companies that are reluctant to offer training. A decisive factor is gaining the 
confidence of the cooperating companies that they will benefit from investing in 
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training. The authors highlight two main factors that are crucial for individual 
companies to cooperate in the collective provision of training: continuous 
government aid and relief of financial burden on training companies especially 
during the apprentices’ first year of training when training costs are usually the 
highest and the productive return from the apprentices the lowest. Gospel and 
Foreman (2006) emphasise that inter-firm cooperation becomes especially fragile 
when the participating companies lack broader government support resulting in 
uncertainties about funding. 
 With respect to our own research, this raises the question as to which features 
of the model favoured in Switzerland contribute to the low prevalence of training 
networks there. 
2.2 Cooperative VET in training networks in Switzerland 
Conceptually, a training network is an organisational network (Leemann and 
Imdorf 2015). Several firms pool their in-company training resources in order to 
generate collective benefits (the corporative benefits) that they could not generate 
as single players or that is qualitatively better than the benefit achievable through 
their individual efforts alone. The collectively generated benefit is then distributed 
among or made accessible to all participating actors (Preisendörfer 2011). 
 The management and control of a training network is in the hands of an 
intermediary organisation, the so-called lead agency. This entity can have different 
legal forms, such as an association, foundation or limited company (cf. BBT 2008). 
The lead agency recruits suitable companies and provides them with technical and 
administrative support. The participating companies pay for these services, which 
constitutes the lead agency’s main source of funding. Other sources of funding are 
e.g. public subsidies or financial contributions by the the founding organisation 
(e.g. trade association).  
 The lead agency also recruits the apprentices, who during the course of their 
training switch training companies on a yearly or half-yearly basis (rotation 
principle). They are employed by the lead agency and have two supervisors: a 
training manager at the lead agency and a vocational trainer at each company. The 
participating companies must transfer certain rights, decision-making powers, and 
areas of exercising influence to the lead agency and the network partner companies, 
such as, for instance, the right to choose their own apprentices or the possibility to 
keep the apprentices for the whole duration of their training. 
 According to Preisendörfer (2011, 26ff.), corporative actors (like 
organisations) are faced with three dimensions of questions and problems that need 
to be defined, negotiated and coordinated:  
(I) Initiation and participation: What are the shared objectives and 
motives of a network (for Switzerland, cf. Leemann et al. 2016)? 
Which resources have to be contributed? 
(II) Decisions: How to organise training and its supervision? How to 
organise member participation in decision making? 
(III) Distribution: How to distribute the corporative benefits? 
This article will analyse the third dimension – the distribution of the corporative 
benefits – to find answers to problems that might form an obstacle to the 
organisation of VET in training networks. One problem arising from the pooling of 
resources is that of free riding, i.e., the possibility that an actor benefits from the 
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network without giving an equivalent in return, which may give rise to imbalances 
in the companies’ commitments. There is, on the one hand, the potential problem 
of internal free riding in the event that one of the participating companies 
contributes fewer resources than the others but claims the same (or even bigger) 
share of the corporative benefits. On the other hand, it is also conceivable that there 
may be external free riding in the sense that companies from outside the network 
take advantage of these corporative benefits without having contributed to the 
cooperative training scheme. 
3 The problem of free riding in a sociology-of-conventions perspective 
The theoretical framework of this study is based on the sociology of conventions 
(also known as the economics of conventions) (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, 
2006; Diaz-Bone 2011, 2015). This pragmatic and transdisciplinary institutional 
theory approach is well-established among French economic sociologists and 
increasingly being adopted also by their German-speaking counterparts. Our 
attempt is to make productive use of this concept in the organisational and 
institutional analysis of VET (Imdorf and Leemann 2012; Leemann and Imdorf 
2015). 
 The starting point is the assumption that competing and mutually conflicting 
logics of action and orders of justice (or conventions) co-exist within organisations 
(Jagd 2011). The respective organisational structure is a compromising device for 
coordinating the different logics of action. It is designed to bridge the 
contradictions between the different conventions and to reduce tensions (Knoll 
2015, 19; Thévenot 2011). However, this process of designing the organisational 
structure is fluid and never completed since the solutions achieved through 
compromises will always create new problems, which the responsible 
organisational actors again need to address (Leemann and Imdorf 2015). 
 With regard to the actors in a training network, this means that the companies 
and the lead agency draw on a limited number of historically evolved conventions 
in their efforts to co-ordinate their training activities, assess the social situations 
occurring in cooperative training settings (e.g., the distribution of corporative 
benefits) and make sound training-related decisions despite inherent uncertainties. 
Table 1 lists the conventions that are relevant to our object of research. Each of 
these conventions is characterised by its orientation towards a certain common 
good, by the significant worth and quality of objects, subjects and processes with 
respect to this common good and by a particular logic of action and order of justice 
meant to contribute to the common good. The order of justice is determined on the 
basis of the principle of equivalence and the model for testing worth (reality test): 
objects, subjects, and processes must be related to some common measure to 
clarify what they have in common (Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, 361) and arrive 
at a socially shared and commonly comprehensible assessment. They must hold up 
to the measure applied, i.e., they are assessed against the measure and ranked 
according to their worth. 
 As mentioned above, free-rider problems emerge from mismatches between 
the resources contributed and corporative benefits reaped. The quality of 
contributed resources and distributed benefits as well as the advantages or 
disadvantages associated with this arrangement are always assessed on the basis of 
conventions. 
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Table 1: Conventions 
Conventions Logics of action, 
orders of justice 
Significant worth / quality 
Industrial 
convention 
Efficiency, expertise 
(long term) 
High productivity, know-
how, technical skills 
Market convention Exchange, competition, 
price (short term) 
Low costs – high return, 
customer orientation 
Civic convention Equality, solidarity, 
participation, inclusion 
Collective interest, 
democratic principles 
Domestic 
convention 
Community, hierarchy, 
tradition, socialisation 
Respect, trust, loyalty, social 
fit 
Convention of fame Fame, renown Reputation, visibility, 
popularity, image 
Convention of 
inspiration 
Inspiration Intrinsic motivation, 
passion, vocation, creativity 
Source: Boltanski and Thévenot (1999, 2006), Diaz-Bone (2009, 2015). 
Highly valued resources are, for instance, a company’s competencies and expertise 
(industrial convention), money (market convention), inclusive recruitment 
practices (civic convention), shaping the individual (domestic convention), brand 
(convention of fame) and attractive training opportunities (convention of 
inspiration). 
 The nature of the corporative benefits varies depending on the convention. In 
regard to the convention of fame, it is, for instance, the reputation that a company 
gains from taking part in the network and in dual VET. However, in the following, 
we will focus on the apprentices (including the graduates who have already 
completed their training) as the corporative benefit that is assessed in terms of its 
quality. With regard to the industrial convention, this involves, for instance, the 
quantity and quality of expertise of skilled junior staff; in terms of the convention 
of inspiration, it refers to having trainees who are highly motivated and identify 
with their chosen occupation or trade. 
4 Analysing free-rider problems in training networks 
After an introduction to the empirical design of this study (4.1), we will present 
two different kinds of free-rider problems and the solution strategies that we 
reconstructed from the data collected in the four networks examined and analyse 
both the problems and solutions from a sociology-of-conventions perspective. The 
first problem that we will address is the imbalances in the distribution of 
apprentices as they move from one company to another (4.2). The second problem 
has to do with the issue of post-training employment (4.3). 
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4.1 Research design 
The data used for this article are derived from a larger research project1, a three-
year case study of four training networks in Switzerland that were selected on the 
basis of typological criteria (Yin 2009). Apart from network size, a factor that will 
not be discussed in detail here, other important selection criteria were the founding 
initiative – who initiated the network and how? Table 2 shows that two of the 
training networks under examination, the Freight Forwarding Network and the 
Public Transport Network, were the result of bottom-up initiatives taken by 
economic actors from the respective industries, while the other two cases studied, 
the Region Network and the Integration Network, were initiated top-down by state 
actors. 
 Our hypothesis is that, depending on the founding initiative, the action of the 
network actors is guided by different convention-specific rationalities. In the case 
of networks initiated by actors from a particular industry or by the participating 
companies themselves, we expect the need for highly qualified junior staff to be a 
driving motive behind the pooling of training resources. Action geared to the 
corporative benefit of having a “qualified workforce” reflects the logic of the 
industrial convention, which is oriented towards the long term and the securing of 
expertise. If it was a government agency that initiated the formation of a training 
network with the objective of generating more training opportunities for young 
people, we can rather expect civic motives, such as participation or inclusion, to be 
at work. 
 
Table 2: The four case studies 
 
Freight Forwarding Network Public Transport Network 
Founding 
initiative 
Trade association (forwarding 
industry), association of 
member companies 
Two public transport 
companies 
Size ~ 35 member companies 
~ 40 apprentices 
~ 4 staff members 
~ 60 member companies 
~ 1,800 apprentices (80% of 
the training places provided by 
a state-owned company) 
~ 280 staff members 
Training 
offered in/as 
1 occupation 
management assistant in 
freight forwarding logistics 
~ 25 occupations,  
most importantly: management 
assistant in public transport 
Network 
objective(s) 
Qualified junior staff for the 
industry 
Qualified junior staff for the 
companies and the industry 
                                                     
1  The data analysed here are from the research project “Training networks in practice – 
A multiple case study on the functioning and the demands of a new organisational 
form of apprenticeship from the perspective of various actors”, financed by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation (SNF-13DPD3_134855) 6/2011–11/2014. Project 
managers: Regula Julia Leemann and Christian Imdorf. Project staff: Lorraine Birr, 
Sandra Da Rin, Rebekka Sagelsdorff and Nicolette Seiterle. 
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Region Network Integration Network 
Founding 
initiative 
Cantonal Office for Vocational 
Education and Orientation, 
Association for the Promotion 
of the Regional Economy 
Municipal government of a 
larger city, 
Centre for Vocational 
Education and Training 
Size ~ 15 member companies 
~ 55 apprentices 
~ 4 staff members 
~ 150 member companies 
~ 220 apprentices 
~ 20 staff members 
Training 
offered in/as 
~ 7 occupations (management 
assistant, technical 
occupations) 
~ 14 occupations across 4 
sectors (e.g., health-care 
assistant, management 
assistant, facility maintenance 
specialist) 
Network 
objective(s) 
Training opportunities in the 
region (peripheral region), 
labour market integration of 
young people 
Training opportunities for 
young people with difficulties 
in finding employment 
We selected nine companies from each network according to the following criteria: 
company size, ownership structure (public or private enterprise), and duration of 
participation in the network. The aim was to make the sample as heterogeneous as 
possible. We conducted semi-structured expert interviews with the employees 
responsible for in-company training in those companies. The interviews lasted 
between one and two hours each and focused on the companies’ motives, 
expectations and experiences in regard to cooperative VET. In each network four 
more expert interviews were conducted with representatives of the respective lead 
agencies to take a closer look at the overall dynamics of the networks and the 
strategies employed to overcome free-rider problems. All interviews took place on 
location in 2011 and 2012 and were recorded and transcribed.  
 Our analysis focused on the interview passages in which the interviewees 
expressed discontent and criticism regarding the distribution of corporative benefits. 
We sought to identify conflicts, areas of tension and the actors’ own explanations 
and justifications thereof with the aim of reconstructing the conventions that the 
actors draw on. 
In a second step, the conflict resolution strategies developed by the companies and 
lead agencies were identified and also interpreted against the backdrop of our 
theoretical framework. 
4.2 Distribution of apprentices over the course of training (rotation 
principle) 
Once they are recruited by the lead agency and assigned to the training companies 
according to the rotational system, the apprentices can be considered a preliminary 
corporative benefit. In several conventions, as will be shown below, the quality of 
an apprentice is rated on the basis of their stage of training (i.e., year of the 
apprenticeship) and the social attribute of “nationality”.  
 Firstly, according to the rotation principle and in view of the training 
requirements, the lead agency has to make sure that the apprentices will have 
become familiar with all aspects relevant to their future occupation by the end of 
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their training. This means to consider the participating companies’ sector- and 
occupation-specific areas of involvement in the light of the training requirements 
and to develop an appropriate training schedule. Secondly, the companies, on their 
part, also make requests and raise demands as to the quality of the apprentices 
assigned to them. Given the fact that all of the companies involved in a training 
network cover different – and equally important – aspects of the training profile, 
the lead agency cannot risk losing individual cooperation partners and is thus under 
pressure to meet their demands. 
 In all four networks under study, our interviewees from the lead agency and 
the training companies mentioned situations of conflict about the apprentices’ 
placements that emerged over the course of their training. 
4.2.1  Distribution according to stage of apprenticeship 
Some companies make participation in the network conditional upon receiving 
only apprentices that are at an advanced stage of their training. As one interviewee 
put it: 
“At the beginning, I had it all, literally everyone who was sent according 
to the training schedule. But because I really need my apprentice, well, 
for me they are really one of my workers [...] we finally decided that I 
really only get second- or third-year [apprentices]. Because I really do 
rely on their assistance.” (Person responsible for in-company training, 
Region Network) 
Advanced-level apprentices are more attractive to the training companies as they 
no longer require basic training, are already to some extent familiar with the trade, 
spend less time at vocational school 2 and are therefore more productive at the 
workplace. In addition, advanced-level apprentices also require less time and effort 
expended in supervision and training. 
 Companies that manage to receive only these advanced apprentices will 
derive disproportionate benefits both in terms of the logic of the industrial 
convention (workforce efficiency and investment in supervision) and the order of 
justice associated with the market convention (cost-benefit ratio). However, the 
cooperative training model only works as long as other companies are willing to 
accept a higher number of first-year apprentices and abstain from demanding their 
share of more experienced trainees, which creates a free-rider situation. 
 The person responsible for in-company training in a department of the state-
owned company in the Public Transport Network explicitly states: “And, of course, 
there also is a relatively high number of free riders.” Referring to another 
department in the large company, he criticises that said department offered many 
‘specialised’ places for final-year apprentices without being able to offer the post-
training employment required by the model of specialised training paths.3 His own 
                                                     
2  In the Swiss dual VET system, the time spent at vocational school (Berufsfachschule) 
varies according to the year of training. Early in the apprenticeship, when trainees are 
not yet very productive on the job, the amount of time spent at vocational school is 
greater and becomes less as training progresses. 
3  Final-year training places are grouped into roughly a dozen of so-called “specialised 
training paths” (Schwerpunktausbildung). The companies can tailor this training to 
their specific needs and, upon completion of training, retain their former apprentices 
without any long familiarisation period (see also, 4.3.3). 
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department, on the other hand, is in high demand of qualified staff and able to offer 
post-training employment. However, since their particular field of work is less 
attractive, they face difficulties in recruiting qualified junior staff as the advanced 
apprentices prefer applying for a final year with the other department. 
 Free-rider situations are also observed by the individual responsible for in-
company training in the Freight Forwarding Network, as quoted below. This 
interviewee is aware of the fact that cooperative training only works if those free-
riding companies also take in apprentices and therefore is ready to accept this 
disadvantage for his own company (“plague”) so as not to put the network model at 
risk (“cholera”). 
“But that’s difficult in our business. Because there are certain training 
companies that say, either I get a third-year apprentice or I won’t train 
anyone at all. [...] And for [person in charge of VET at the lead agency] 
or for us as a network, that’s choosing between plague and cholera.” 
(Person responsible for in-company training, Freight Forwarding 
Network) 
This person responsible for in-company training displays solidarity with the lead 
agency and is willing to put the collective interest – maintaining the network and 
high-quality cooperative training opportunities for the industry – over the interests 
of individual companies, which are rooted in the industrial and market conventions. 
His attitude reflects the order of justice of the civic convention. 
 However, as the interview continued, it became apparent that the fact that 
certain other companies take in only advanced-level apprentices and thus 
disproportionately profit from the network model evokes some degree of 
discontent with the lead agency’s mode of handling the situation. The interviewee 
suggest an even distribution of apprentices, with each company being assigned an 
equal share of apprentices at all levels of training, adding that it was the lead 
agency’s responsibility to enforce this. “That there perhaps be a fairer distribution. 
Maybe that we simply manage to introduce a structure that can’t really be 
criticised.” According to civic rationality, justice is served when all companies 
participating in the network can equally benefit from the apprentices’ continuously 
growing skills. Equivalence is assessed against the measure of “equal treatment”, 
and the reality test is the planning of apprentice assignments to the network 
companies, which could no longer be subject to criticism if equal treatment were 
applied. 
 However, as we may add from a more distant perspective, this would require 
that all companies participating in the training network base action on civic 
rationality. In this case, criticism would be unnecessary and the distribution of 
apprentices among the companies would not evoke (manifest or latent) conflicts. 
4.2.2  Distribution along the lines of ‘Swiss’ or ‘foreigner’ 
In our interviews with persons employees for in-company training, it also became 
apparent that some companies more or less explicitly ask for a ‘Swiss’ apprentice 
and hold a rather critical view of those considered ‘foreigners’, especially of south 
eastern European origin. This preference for a “Swiss boy” is illustrated by the 
interviewee responsible for in-company training of a company in the Region 
Network, which offers training in technical trades. Dissatisfied with the assignment 
of apprentices to his company, he states: 
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“And we don’t necessarily have those we’d like best. A Swiss boy that we 
could first test a while by way of an extended trial apprenticeship.” 
(Person responsible for in-company training, Region Network) 
Our interviews with the lead agency representatives confirm this result. Some 
companies are reluctant to train young people who are labelled “foreign[ers]”. The 
managing director of the lead agency of the Integration Network point out that he 
knows perfectly well to which company he could not send apprentices “with black 
skin” or “a headscarf” He adds that for the sake of the network’s mission to 
provide training opportunities also for socially disadvantaged youths, other 
companies are willing to accept apprentices who are difficult to place. 
“To these companies, it doesn’t matter much. They simply want a young 
person who functions. Which of course is a good thing because we can 
sell them also Muslims and blacks and everything.” (Lead agency 
representative, Integration Network) 
Guided by civic rationality, these companies are also ready to take in additional 
apprentices out of turn if necessary, for instance, if apprentices have to be 
transferred due to conflicts at the scheduled company that threaten the continuation 
of their apprenticeship. 
 In the cases just described, a free-rider problem results from the fact that 
pursuing a ‘Swiss’ only strategy promises higher individual benefits along the lines 
of an industrial, market or domestic logic, at least if training youths labelled 
“foreign” is expected to create problems in terms of efficiency, costs versus 
benefits or fitting into the company setting. Efficiency problems occur, for instance, 
when apprentices with insufficient German language skills require a higher level of 
attention and support in performing their school- or work-related tasks. Moreover, 
as several company representatives responsible for in-house training pointed out, 
there is the potential risk that these apprentices fail their final exams. In the 
industrial convention’s long-term rationale of creating a qualified workforce, this 
amounts to a bad investment.  
 One of the interviewees responsible for in-company training in the Freight 
Forwarding Network described how the contact with customers can be affected by 
a lack of language proficiency, which indicates that the quality of the apprentices is 
assessed on the basis of criteria belonging to the market convention. 
“When they [...] have to communicate about insured events, damages and 
the like, you really need letters that are properly written. In customer care 
[...], if they write letters with fifteen mistakes in just three sentences, then 
this doesn’t go down well [with our customers].” (Person responsible for 
in-company training, Freight Forwarding Network) 
Employing youths who are labelled as “foreign” can also cause opposition and 
tensions among the rest of the workforce, which is explained by not fitting in along 
the lines of the company’s domestic convention (Imdorf and Leemann 2012; 
Lendaro and Imdorf 2012). At the same time, the networks have to recruit their 
apprentices from a socially heterogeneous group of young people and train 
apprentices with different social attributes and educational backgrounds for the 
simple fact that this heterogeneity represents demographic reality. Here again, the 
network is only sustainable if some of the participating companies are willing to 
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accept potential risks and base action on a different order of justice. And once 
again, we find that some persons responsible for in-company training are guided by 
civic motives in offering training opportunities specifically to those disadvantaged 
youths. It can even be that a company explicitly asks for these apprentices – which 
offers an emotional benefit instead of creating a free-rider problem. 
“Well, let me put it this way [...] somehow my heart beats for those kids 
whose lives aren’t that easy  [...] who, for whatever reason, didn’t take 
such a straight path, during their schooling or because of their 
background in general. They are particularly close to my heart and that’s 
why I keep saying, ‘I have room for many.’” (Person responsible for in-
company training, Integration Network) 
In Switzerland, there is some degree of social pressure on companies and 
businesses to engage in dual VET and offer training opportunities for the young 
generation. Their customers, among others, are attentive to their training activities, 
and they must account for their efforts in this area, for instance, by placing a sticker 
informing incoming customers that the business provides such training. 
Participating in a training network offers companies the opportunity to engage in 
dual VET but leaves the training of ‘difficult’ apprentices to the other network 
participants. In this way, they gain a positive image as training companies taking 
part in a progressive model of VET without having to equally invest in achieving 
significant worth in terms of the convention of fame. This would constitute yet 
another potential free-rider problem, for which we did not find any immediate 
evidence though. 
4.2.3 Strategies to solve distribution problems 
One strategy to prevent or mitigate free-rider problems related to the distribution of 
apprentices according to their year of training consists in grading the companies’ 
financial contributions to the network depending on the stage of training of the 
apprentices received. The more advanced the apprentice, the higher the costs. This 
has two elements: the fees for the support services provided by the lead agency are 
structured such that the rates are highest during the final year of training, and, just 
as in the traditional VET system, advanced-level apprentices are also paid more 
than novices. This cost structure reduces the financial burden on companies that 
take in first-year apprentices and raises the costs for those that opt for their 
advanced-level counterparts. The Freight Forwarding Network is not the only 
training network in Switzerland that has adopted such a strategy, as confirmed by 
the nation-wide evaluation survey (BBT 2008, p. 19). In a theoretical perspective, 
this approach to solving the problem of free riding is guided by a market-oriented 
order of justice. The ‘purchase value’ of a third-year apprentice is increased and 
that of a first-year apprentice is reduced.  
 The Region Network has now begun to more strongly involve the companies 
in the process of selecting apprentices – a strategy aimed at creating a greater 
readiness to also accept those bearing the label of ‘foreigner’. In a joint effort, the 
lead agency and the companies have revised the selection procedure, including the 
introduction of an additional step in the form of a trial apprenticeship. During this 
in-company trial period, the applicants are subjected to a series of reality tests, and 
the lead agency bases the employment decision on the results of this on-the-job 
assessment. This problem-solving strategy represents a compromise between the 
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civic and the market logic. The former practice criticised by some companies 
according to which the lead agency had simply assigned the apprentices to their 
company placements has now been replaced by a scheme in which the companies 
have a say (civic convention) in the ‘purchase’ of apprentices (market convention). 
The companies participate in determining and testing the quality of potential 
apprentices and thus gain a more realistic picture of the quality of the applicants in 
the recruitment pool.  
 In accepting applicants who are considered to be ‘foreign’, the Integration 
Network takes into account the number of companies in the network that are 
willing to train these youths. Being offered an apprenticeship is already informed 
by considerations about who can be sent to which company. The most likely 
options are small and medium-sized businesses that have a social commitment, 
state-owned companies, which have a certain obligation to contribute to social 
integration, and large international players whose corporate culture is geared 
towards diversity. As part of this strategy, the lead agency seeks to bring more of 
these companies on board. For instance, a recently launched project has explicitly 
approached companies that have senior staff of immigrant background and do not 
yet offer VET to encourage them to become involved in providing such training. 
The idea is that, due to their own migration experience, these senior staff members 
are more inclined to accept apprentices who are labelled as ‘foreigners’. 
 All the above examples of problem-solving strategies are based on the civic 
convention, sometimes by making a compromise with the market convention. The 
lead agency counts on the social commitment of the network companies but also 
has to consider market realities; i.e., it can only hire as many ‘foreign’ apprentices 
as the market is ready to absorb on the demand side. 
4.3 Post-training recruitment and employment 
Free-rider problems also emerge in the event that the companies participating in 
the network do not all have the same opportunity to hire the newly graduated 
apprentices or due to staff poaching by competitors from outside the network. 
Conflicts arising from the issue of post-training recruitment were discovered 
particularly in the Public Transport Network and the Freight Forwarding Network, 
which are the two networks initiated by economic actors from the industry in an 
effort to train their own junior staff. This confirms our initial hypothesis that the 
founding initiative is a significant factor (see 4.1). The following sections will 
present internal and external free-rider problems in post-training recruitment that 
were identified primarily in these two training networks. 
4.3.1 Intra-network recruitment of apprenticeship graduates 
As a consequence of the rotation system, the apprentices become familiar with 
different companies. Hence, they are less likely to develop strong company loyalty 
than those trained in the traditional single-employer VET model. The companies 
become rivals in the competition for the fresh graduates, giving rise to the crucial 
question of who is better at recruiting. 
 Potential network partners are concerned that participating in the rotation 
system could lead them to lose qualified junior staff to other companies in the 
training network and thus decide against participating in this model of cooperative 
VET. This is why the lead agency of the Freight Forwarding Network offers a 
second training model without rotation as an alternative route. In this latter model, 
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the companies acquire the lead agency’s services only for apprentice recruitment 
and certain assistance for these recruits, while the apprentices are employed by the 
company and undergo their entire training there. 
 The state-owned company and another large firm in the Public Transport 
Network perceive the system of company-switching as a threat to their own efforts 
in junior staff development since it could encourage intra-network poaching. 
“When they [the apprentices] also go to other companies, then it’s easy 
for them [the companies] [...], for instance, to lure those who make a 
good impression with higher post-training salaries or with slightly better 
working conditions. That’s of course a bit more difficult once they have 
left [our com-pany].” (Person responsible for in-company training, state-
owned company, Public Transport Network) 
The resulting free-rider problems are complex, as the interviews with lead agency 
representatives as well as with individuals responsible for in-company training in 
the Public Transport Network indicated. The interviewee quoted above referred to 
the fact that, unlike in the traditional VET setting, the apprentices get to know a 
whole range of different companies. Compared to the traditional scenario in which 
qualified youngsters enter the labour market only after the completion of training, 
the network model pits the participating companies more obviously against one 
another in their competition for apprenticeship graduates. Unequal bargaining 
power, such as one company being able to offer more attractive salaries than 
another, becomes a problem for the cooperative training model. 
 The large state-owned company’s discontent with the new competitive 
situation is better understood within the wider context of the network membership 
regulations. In accordance with the civic order of justice, the Swiss Confederation 
(as the sole shareholder) has required the company to bring its full capacity to bear 
– i.e., its many training places, broad expertise and large financial resources – in 
contributing to the network so as to serve the common good of “public transport” 
as a whole. In our interviewee’s opinion, this leads to a mismatch between the 
resources contributed by his company and the share of the corporative benefits it 
receives in return. Arguing within the market logic, he criticised that, being a large 
entreprise, his own company makes disproportionately high investments in training 
apprentices (costs, efforts) but retains far too few graduates in return (benefits, 
returns on investment), whereas particularly the small businesses within the 
network benefit from lower training costs and innovations by his company. 
“In this sense [we are] rivals in post-training recruitment – precisely. 
Over the course of the training, the distribution is obvious: we are at the 
giving end [...], and we take too little afterwards.” (Person responsible 
for in-company training, state-owned company, Public Transport 
Network) 
These tensions arise due to the fact that the state-owned company has to reconcile 
two conflicting orders of justice. Fully owned by the Swiss Confederation, the 
company is subject to political governance and required to give priority to the 
collective interest (Summermatter 2012). However, since the liberalisation of rail 
traffic and its conversion to a special stock (limited) corporation, the company has 
also become a private enterprise that is committed to market logic and assesses the 
distribution of the corporative benefits along those lines. 
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 The aforementioned “luring salaries” offered by other network companies are 
not the only reason for discontent. Some offer training places that are also far more 
attractive and provide a wider range of experiences than others. The rotation 
system has the effect that the apprentices are able to compare. Some companies 
may “seem a bit old-fashioned and dusty”, while others are more appealing to 
young people and promise more varied tasks. Some of these attractive companies 
are associated with leisure and travelling, foreign countries and adventure, and thus 
possess qualities belonging to the convention of inspiration. Others are appealing 
because of their well-known name, which gives them significant worth in the 
convention of fame. 
“Apprentices who complete their entire training from beginning [to end] 
at [company X] know [company X] and will stay with [company X] 
afterwards. 4 But if someone has been at an airport or with a railway 
operator in the mountains or some place of that kind, it’s as clear as 
daylight that they’ll be mightily impressed and we’ll have lost them.” 
(Person responsible for in-company training, Public Transport Network) 
Free-rider problems in post-training recruitment also arise from the above-
described uneven distribution of apprentices who are at different stages of training 
(4.2.1). Companies that train mainly final-year apprentices are in a better position 
to retain them by offering post-training employment before or once they have 
graduated. Some companies in the Region Network, for instance, demand that the 
lead agency send them third-year apprentices in the technical occupations – with 
the intention of keeping these youths for the fourth (and final) year of training and, 
hopefully, also after its completion. Accessing the jointly trained junior staff pool 
thus becomes more difficult for those companies that receive a larger number of 
apprenticeship novices. 
 Moreover, training final-year apprentices entails advantages in terms of 
identifying the most suitable candidates for post-training employment. The 
company can subject them to a series of reality tests and select the graduates with 
the best results: for instance, in terms of (i) their fit with the team and the corporate 
culture as well as their readiness to integrate into the existing hierarchies and 
norms (domestic convention), (ii) their dealing with customers and handling of 
resources (market convention), (iii) their efficiency, expertise and care in 
performing their work (industrial convention) or (iv) with regard to their 
motivation and commitment (convention of inspiration). 
 In the last example of a free-rider problem in intra-network recruitment of 
apprenticeship graduates, the interviewee of a company participating in the Public 
Transport Network draws his criticism on the convention of fame. He feels 
threatened by the state-owned corporation’s behaviour and accused the large firm 
of increasingly trying to move itself into the limelight of the network’s public 
relations activities, which have so far been “neutral” in this respect – the effect 
being that his own company is virtually disappearing from the public radar and 
thus losing its appeal to apprenticeship graduates. The lead agency grants a far 
higher level of visibility to one company than to the other network partners.5 It has, 
                                                     
4  This part of the quote refers to the traditional single-employer VET model (“X” stands 
for the company name). The second part then refers to the network model. 
5  Granting the state-owned corporation a higher level of visibility was the lead agency’s 
response to the above-described problem of this company complaining about the 
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for instance, launched a new advertising campaign that no longer includes the 
logos of all network member companies but only that of the large state-owned 
corporation.  
4.3.2 Poaching from outside the network 
On the issue of post-training recruitment, the person responsible for in-company 
training in a company involved in the Public Transport Network explained that 
there usually was no competition for graduates among the network members. He 
believed the working conditions in the industry to be the main reason for 
apprenticeship graduates to leave his company. This was confirmed by other 
persons responsible for in-company training both in the Public Transport and the 
Freight Forwarding Network. There is a certain pull effect from other sectors: 
“But please take a look at the figures in the freight forwarding community, 
how many graduates we have. And how many of them we lose to banks, 
insurance companies, you name it, trade and retailing, manufacturing. I 
think we train at least one third [of our apprentices] for other sectors.” 
(Person responsible for in-company training, Freight Forwarding 
Network) 
Both networks provide high-quality training for management assistants. The 
graduates, however, are enticed away by the banking and insurance sector, which 
feature more attractive conditions in terms of working hours and remuneration. 
Road building companies also offer higher pay and thus manage to recruit the 
Public Transport Network’s graduates in railway track construction. Such external 
free riding hinges on the network members investing in the training of junior staff 
and companies from other sectors and industries reaping the rewards. Moreover, 
there are free-riding companies from the network members’ own industries that do 
not participate in the cooperative training efforts but woo their graduates [instead]. 
 On the other hand, the network companies do not necessarily intend to retain 
their apprentices immediately after graduation since there are not always suitable 
vacancies to fill – but they are nonetheless convinced that the training network is 
an important factor in addressing their industry’s staff development problem in the 
long term. This is why retaining the graduates in the industry matters. Developing a 
skilled labour pool with a sense of loyalty to the industry will thus also help the 
network companies meet their own future demands for qualified staff. A statement 
made by the person responsible for in-company training in an aviation company in 
the Public Transport Network illustrates this perspective. With regard to the 
graduates, he said: 
“I don’t mind if they go to [aviation company X] or to [aviation company 
Y] or to [aviation company Z]. But please stay in aviation and don’t leave 
for insurancing. That’s the main thing. In Switzerland, aviation is such a 
small biotope.” (Person responsible for in-company training, aviation 
company, Public Transport Network) 
                                                                                                                                       
mismatch between its investments in training and the low graduate retention rate. We 
thus have an example of a problem-solving strategy that creates new problems among 
the network members. On the perpetual dynamics of problem, solution strategy and 
new problem, see Leemann and Imdorf 2015. 
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The strategy pursued by external free riders is to meet their demands for qualified 
junior staff through the short-term “buying” of manpower in the labour market. 
They act and invest on the rational basis of the market convention and lure the 
network-trained young specialists with more attractive job offers. This poses a 
threat to the network’s own efforts of staff development – which are in line with 
the industrial convention – and to the long-term “making” of manpower by way of 
inter-firm cooperation (Sydow and Möllering 2009; Thévenot 2001, 412). 
4.3.3 Solving the problems of post-training recruitment 
The lead agency of the Freight Forwarding Network keeps an eye on the possibility 
of unfair competition between the member companies and manages the distribution 
of corporative benefits in a proactive way. Companies looking for a trained expert 
can get in touch with the lead agency. 
“There is kind of an unwritten agreement that the member companies then 
will be sent near-graduates. Because, at some point, there has to be a 
return on investment. And I do appreciate that it works that way.” 
(Person responsible for in-company training, Freight Forwarding 
Network) 
The lead agency will send either a fresh graduate or a final-year apprentice whom 
the company can even test by offering a taster day before hiring them. Since there 
is hardly a situation in which all companies simultaneously have the same staffing 
demands, collisions of interest and shortages are rare. 
 In addition, the network companies and the lead agency join forces to exert 
their influence at the trade-association level and fix the starting salaries for 
graduates to prevent intra-sector poaching. Companies that are not member of the 
training network restraint in pursuing the network-trained graduates as they are 
closely monitored by the trade association. The lead agency itself sends graduates 
only to network member companies and does not give their names to companies 
outside the network. 
 Hence, the lead agency employs various strategies to ensure that all member 
companies participate in the corporative benefits and to protect these benefits 
against external interests. To exclude competitors from other industries, the agency 
also seeks to encourage sector loyalty among the apprentices, who are already 
required to demonstrate that their choice of occupation is motivated by their 
interest in and commitment to the freight forwarding industry when applying for 
the apprenticeship. 
 By offering training programs featuring great variety, the rotation system then 
gives apprentices the opportunity to become familiar with different corporate 
cultures and seeks to spark their enthusiasm for the international nature of working 
in the industry so as to encourage a long-term commitment. 
“What I’ve noted personally is that the apprentices really stay in the 
industry. Because once they’ve been infected with, let’s call it the 
forwarding bug [laughter], they can’t easily get rid of it anymore.” 
(Person responsible for in-company training, Freight Forwarding 
Network) 
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This idea of “infecting” (vaccinating) the apprentices with the “industry bug” to 
immunise them against competing job offers from outside the industry relies on the 
power of the convention of inspiration. The same strategy is employed in the 
Public Transport Network when looking for highly motivated youths who “burn for 
railroading”. In this particular case, network training has to follow the objective of 
strengthening the apprentices’ emotional ties to both the company and the industry 
since drawing on the market order of justice by offering higher pay is not possible. 
“By necessity, we would rather have to tie the apprentices to [company 
name] EMOTIONALLY because we cannot compete with the external 
market when it comes to wages. [...] That we spark their enthusiasm for 
[company name], for [subsector], [...] the wide range of services we offer, 
the great variety of tasks that characterises work in our business.” 
(Person responsible for in-company training, Public Transport Network) 
The lead agency of the Public Transport Network urges the member companies to 
offer follow-up employment and sign contracts some time prior to the final exam, 
as potential employers from outside the network keep asking the agency for the 
names of new graduates, especially in the technical field. Unlike its counterpart in 
the Freight Forwarding Network, this lead agency feels obliged to reveal the names 
of graduates unless they have not received a job offer from a network company. 
 In an attempt to regulate the dynamics of post-training recruitment, in the 
Public Transport Network a new system, guided by market logic, has been 
implemented for the third year of training. There now is an open application 
process for third-year training places, in which the latter are grouped into a dozen 
of so-called “specialised training paths”. The apprentices have to apply for those 
places towards the end of their second year (two applications per person), and the 
companies then make their choice. The same market logic is also behind the 
introduction of a job fair for final-year apprentices, an event at which the 
companies present themselves to the near-graduates. 
 The state-owned corporation also relies on the domestic convention in its 
attempts to counterbalance the described disadvantages in post-training recruitment. 
To establish and strengthen company loyalty among the apprentices, this company 
holds a special welcome event, sends birthday and Christmas greeting cards, and a 
small gift if, for instance, an apprentice has had an accident. Being the most 
important network member, the company also used its bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the lead agency to push for a new advertising campaign (4.3.1) – a move that falls 
into the domain of the convention of fame. 
 Moreover, the lead agency has now reacted to the state-owned corporation’s 
persistent criticism of the existent rotation system and decided to introduce a new 
model specifically tailored to the large firms in the network. A “primary training 
company” is determined at the beginning of the apprenticeship where the 
apprentices will spend the first semester as well as the final year of their training. 
This move also relies on the vigour of the domestic order of justice, since the 
prolonged stay at just one company is ultimately bound to weaken the rotation 
system. 
5 Summary and conclusion 
Based on four case studies of training networks in Switzerland, we have tried to 
understand why this model – albeit being a promising form of dual VET – is taking 
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hold rather slowly in terms of prevalence and degree of institutionalisation. Our 
focus was on identifying potential free-rider problems that result from mismatches 
between the resources contributed to the network by the individual member 
companies and their returns in the form of access to an equitable share of the 
corporative benefits. 
 The most significant corporative benefit are the apprentices, who are recruited 
and jointly trained to meet the future skilled labour demands of the participating 
companies and the industry as a whole. With this in mind, we analysed, firstly, the 
rotational assignment of apprentices to the companies over the course of training 
and, secondly, the companies’ opportunities for post-training retention or 
recruitment. Our analytical approach was informed by the theoretical framework of 
the sociology of conventions. Conventions refer to historically evolved, competing 
and mutually conflicting logics of action and orders of justice. Our assumption was 
that the actors in the training networks draw on different conventions (industrial, 
market, civic and domestic convention, convention of fame, convention of 
inspiration) in their efforts to co-ordinate their training activities and assess the 
quality of contributed resources and distributed benefits, which ultimately leads to 
free-rider problems. As a consequence, they have to look for compromises between 
the conventions to solve conflicts accruing from these free-rider problems and to 
uphold the training network.  
 In our study, we addressed two main questions: (1) Which particular 
constellations draw criticism because of single actors disproportionately profiting 
from the training network and its corporative benefits, that is, by contributing 
fewer resources than benefits reaped (free-rider problem)? (2) How do the lead 
agency and the companies within the network try to address these free-rider 
problems? What are their solution strategies? 
 Our key finding is that the rotation system according to which the apprentices 
move from one company to another over the course of their training creates various 
free-rider constellations in distributing the corporative benefits, both during the 
training itself and after its completion. An important issue during the training is the 
heterogeneity of the apprentices due to their different levels of advancement and 
different social attributes. The lead agency is challenged with a ‘fair’ distribution 
of this socially structured corporative benefit among the network companies. At the 
same time, the participating companies differ in size and profile, and thus also in 
terms of their significance for the network-based training scheme. Some are better 
able to assert their interests than others, which further nourishes imbalances. The 
assessment of whether the distribution of the corporative benefit in the form of 
“apprentices” is fair or not ultimately depends on the convention upon which a 
company relies in evaluating the quality of the young people sent by the lead 
agency. 
 Once the training is completed, the network member companies become rivals 
in recruiting the graduates. Another threat is poaching, in other words, employment 
offers by external competitors. Free-rider problems arise from the fact that the 
companies and industries are heterogeneous, i.e., they have different qualities when 
viewed from the angle of the different conventions: they vary in terms of the 
resources they can contribute and the means they have to recruit graduates or 
convince them to stay. In addition, we identified situations where a lead agency has 
privileged certain companies and grant them advantages in demonstrating their 
qualities because of their significance for the network as a whole. The graduates 
base their post-training job decision upon their own assessment of different 
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qualities. If a company has too little significant worth in one of the relevant 
conventions, its resource contributions will be rated as insufficient and its access to 
the collectively generated corporative benefits will be limited.  
The strategies to solve the distribution problem during and after the training period 
consist in efforts to attain a higher level of fairness or to balance inequities related 
to one convention by means of offering compensation or an investment in another 
convention. The lead agency plays a key role in moderating the different demands 
for fairness and justice. It must address the various complaints about injustices and 
mismatches, and develop solutions to prevent (important) member companies from 
leaving the training network. However, since the network is always simultaneously 
faced with different and competing logics of action and orders of justice, these 
solutions are inevitably compromises between different conventions and thus 
tentative and not very durable. 
 To sum up, we believe that the slow dissemination and hesitant acceptance of 
the Swiss training network model can be explained by the free-rider problems 
associated with the rotation system and the perpetual dynamics of conflict and 
compromise that it involves. 
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